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THE HOLDING REQUIREMENT OF SECTION
1031 -MA GNESON V. COMMISSIONER
N RMAN and Beverly Magneson owned a fee simple interest in an
apartment building (Iowa Street Property), held for investment
within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code section 1031(a).,
N.E.R. Plaza, Ltd., a California limited partnership, owned commercial
property known as the Plaza Property. In the first step of a prearranged
transaction the Magnesons exchanged their fee interest in the Iowa Street
Property for a ten percent undivided interest in the Plaza Property. The
Magnesons then exchanged their interest in the Plaza Property for a general
partnership interest in U.S. Trust, Ltd., a California limited partnership.2
The general partnership interest consisted of a ten percent equity interest
and a nine percent interest in the net profits and losses of U.S. Trust. U.S.
Trust acquired the remaining ninety percent undivided interest in the Plaza
Property on the same day. Based on the nonrecognition provision of section
1031(a), the Magnesons did not pay taxes on the gain realized from the ex-
change of their Iowa Street Property for the Plaza Property.3 Furthermore,
the Magnesons claimed nonrecognition treatment under section 7214 for
their contribution of their Plaza Property interest to U.S. Trust and, accord-
ingly, paid no tax on the realized gain from that transaction. 5
The Commissioner determined a deficiency in the Magnesons' 1977 fed-
eral income tax return, asserting that the exchange of the Iowa Street Prop-
erty for the Plaza Property did not qualify for nonrecognition under section
1031(a). The Service stated that the Magnesons failed to hold the Plaza
Property for investment 6 as required by section 1031(a). The Magnesons
1. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1954, as amended through 1977). Section 1031(a) provides in part:
"No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business or
for investment ... is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for produc-
tive use in trade or business or for investment." The Magnesons' use of the property for invest-
ment purposes did not constitute an issue in the case.
2. In addition to their interest in the Plaza Property, the Magnesons also contributed
cash in exchange for the partnership interest in U.S. Trust.
3. The parties stipulated that the Magnesons' interest in the Iowa Street Property and
the Plaza Property were like-kind properties within the meaning of § 1031(a).
4. I.R.C. § 721 (1954, as amended through 1977). This section provides that "[n]o gain
or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of its partners in the case of a contribu-
tion of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership." Id.
5. The parties agreed that the Magnesons' contribution of their interest in the Plaza
Property and cash to U.S. Trust for their general partnership interest constituted a nontaxable
transaction under the provisions of I.R.C. § 721.
6. The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit used the phrase "held for investment" through-
out their opinions because the distinction between productive use and investment was not
material to the case. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81
T.C. 767, 769 (1983).
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challenged the deficiency in the Tax Court,7 contending that holding the
property to contribute to a partnership satisfied the requisite investment pur-
pose. The Tax Court agreed with the Magnesons and found that the contri-
bution of the Plaza Property to U.S. Trust constituted a continuation of the
Magnesons' unliquidated investment in a modified form, thus fulfilling the
requirement of section 1031(a).8 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Tax
Court's conclusion of the law de novo. Held, affirmed: Property acquired in
a like-kind exchange with the intention of contributing it to a general part-
nership in return for an interest in that partnership satisfies the holding re-
quirement of section 1031(a) and entitles the taxpayer to nonrecognition
treatment of the exchange. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th
Cir. 1985).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOLDING REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1031
Section 1031 represents the culmination of legislative efforts to allow non-
recognition of a paper gain or loss on an exchange of property that merely
continues an investment in like-kind property. 9 The reasoning behind sec-
tion 1031 emanates from section 202(c)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1921.10
Section 202(c)(1) extended nonrecognition treatment to transactions in
which a taxpayer exchanged property held for investment or productive use
in business'I for property categorized as like in kind or use. 12 The report of
the Senate Committee on Finance explained that section 202(c)(1) purported
to provide new rules for those exchanges of property in which a taxpayer
realized a technical gain under the prior law without realizing an actual cash
profit. '3
Congress reconsidered the advisability of deferring gain or loss on a like-
kind exchange in 1934. The legislative history underlying Congress's deci-
sion to reenact the deferral provision constitutes the source from which
7. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767 (1983).
8. Id. at 771; see infra text accompanying notes 16, 17.
9. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 554,
564.
10. Pub. L. No. 98, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1923). In nonstatutory form, the prin-
ciples of § 1031 appeared in regulations under the Revenue Act of 1918, specifically, Reg. 65,
arts. 1563, 1565, and 1566, cited in 3 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 20.21 n.15 (rev. ed. 1981), and Reg. 45, art. 1563, T.D. 2971, 2 C.B. 38 (1920). See also 4 B.
BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS app. C (1981) (historical
development of the nonrecognition concept).
11. Section 202(c)(1) expressly excluded "stock in trade" held primarily for sale from
qualification as "property held for investment or productive use in trade or business."
12. Id. Section 202(c) actually provided for the nonrecognition of gain or loss on an ex-
change of any type of property unless the property received in the exchange had "a readily
realizable market value." If the property had a recognized market value, then only the ex-
change of business or investment property (excluding stock in trade and other property held
primarily for sale) for property of a like-kind or use qualified for nonrecognition. Section
203(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924 eliminated the "readily realizable market value" require-
ment, but carried forward its nonrecognition treatment of like-kind exchanges. Pub. L. No.
176, § 203, 43 Stat. 253, 256 (1924).




courts have derived the purpose of section 1031.14 The 1934 history reflects
several reasons for retaining the like-kind exchange provision, including val-
uation difficulties and protection of revenues. 15 Courts, however, generally
have emphasized that the taxpayer in a like-kind exchange has continued his
investment in the same kind of property and thus has realized only a theoret-
ical profit or loss that in equity should qualify for nonrecognition treat-
ment. 16 This continuity of investment rationale now provides the basis for
allowing nonrecognition treatment to like-kind exchanges under section
1031.17
In its present form section 1031 requires deferral of any gain or loss real-
ized upon the exchange of property held for productive use in trade or busi-
ness or for investment for property of a like kind. 18 A taxpayer must satisfy
three criteria to qualify for nonrecognition treatment based on a like-kind
exchange. First, the taxpayer must exchange property' for other qualified
property. 19 Second, the exchange must involve like-kind properties. 20 Fi-
nally, the taxpayer must have held the exchanged property for productive
use in trade or business or for investment.2 1
14. [P]rofit or loss is recognized in the case of exchanges of notes or securities,
which are essentially like money; or in the case of stock in trade; or in case the
taxpayer exchanges the property comprising his original investment for a differ-
ent kind of property; but if the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same kind
of property as that in which it was originally invested, he is not allowed to com-
pute and deduct his theoretical loss on the exchange, nor is he charged with a
tax upon his theoretical profit.
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 554, 564.
15. The congressional record reflects a concern that the necessity of evaluating the prop-
erty in "thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions" would involve great admin-
istrative costs. The record shows that Congress believed that the net revenues that could be
collected from the like-kind exchange transactions would not justify these additional adminis-
trative expenses. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
(pt. 2) 554, 564.
16. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Godine v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1597 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 554, 564; Duhl, Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section 1031:
Multiparty Exchanges, Nonsimultaneous Exchanges and Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 58
TAXES 949, 950-51 (1980); Comment, The Exchange Requirement in Multiparty and Non-
simultaneous Exchanges. A Critical Analysis and Statutory Solution, 37 Sw. L.J. 645, 645-48
(1983).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1. 1002-1(c), T.D. 6,500, 25 Fed. Reg. 11,954 (1960); see, e.g., Leslie Co.
v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d
453 (2d Cir. 1959); Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653 (1980); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 905 (1978), affid, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1982).
19. Qualifying property does not include "stock in trade or other property held primarily
for sale ... stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or
other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest .... I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1982); see
Madden, Taxation of Real Estate Transactions-An Overview, 480 TAX. MGMT. (BNA) 98, 99-
101 (1984).
20. As used in § 1031(a) the words "like kind" mean alike in "nature" and "character"
and not necessarily alike in "grade or quality." Exchange of one kind of class of property for
property of a different class may not occur under that section. Treas. Reg. § 1. 103 1(a)- 1(b),
T.D. 6935, 1967-2 C.B. 292; see D. WALTERS, REAL ESTATE EXCHANGES 47-53 (1982); Le-
vine, Exchanging Interests in Partnerships Under Code Section 1031, 17 TAX NOTES 649
(1982).
21. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1982).
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The third requirement, that the taxpayer have held exchanged property
for investment, has evoked significantly fewer judicial and administrative in-
terpretations than the exchange and like-kind requirements of section
103 1.22 Neither the Code nor the regulations define the phrase "held for
productive use in trade or business or for investment." Consequently, courts
frequently have referred to sections 1221(1) and 1231 for guidance in inter-
preting section 1031 based on similar language in those sections. 23 Courts
have interpreted the phrase "property held primarily for sale," used in the
exclusionary parenthetical of section 103 1(a), more liberally than the phrase
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of his trade or business," which appears in sections 1221(1) and
123 1.24
A present intention of the taxpayer to sell the property received in an
exchange precludes the exchange from receiving nonrecognition treatment
under section 103 1.25 In particular, a dealer 26 must recognize his gain or
loss on an exchange of property since he ordinarily does not hold the prop-
erty for the required purpose. The dealer holds the property primarily for
sale rather than for investment. 27 In situations not involving dealers, how-
22. Guttenberg, Continuity of Investment is Key to Using 1031 in Combination with a
Corporate Transaction, 60 J. TAX'N 280, 280 (1984); see 7 FED. TAXES (P-H) 31,666,
31,667, 31,670 (1985).
23. Sections 1221(1) and 1231 contain similar, but not identical, language to § 1031. Sec-
tions 1221(1) and 1231 disallow capital gains treatment for gains from the sale of property
"held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of (his) trade or
business." I.R.C. §§ 1221(1), 1231(2) (1954, as amended through 1977); see also Margolis v.
Commissioner, 337 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1964) (court disallowed nonrecognition of exchange on
basis that acquired properties were held for sale in the ordinary course of business); Rev. Rul.
59-229, 1959-2 C.B. 180 (under I.R.C. § 1031 unharvested crops treated as property used in
trade or business, not as inventory based on I.R.C. § 1231(b)(4)); Treas. Reg. § 1.103 l(a)-1(b)
(1967) ("unproductive real estate held by one other than a dealer for future use or future
realization of the increment in value is held for investment and not primarily for sale"); D.
WALTERS, supra note 20, at 80; Levine & McCormick, Taxfree Exchanges Under Section
1031, 61-4th [Portfolio] TAX MGMT. (BNA) 3 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Griffin v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 253, 260 (1967) (court disallowed nonrec-
ognition treatment on like-kind exchange because nondealer taxpayer had contracted to sell
the acquired property prior to the exchange); Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90, 96 (1960)
(court rejected taxpayer's argument that property acquired in a like-kind exchange but held
primarily for sale should come within § 1031 if the sale was not within the taxpayer's ordinary
course of business).
25. Griffin v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 253 (1967); Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90
(1960); see also Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 194, 208 (1940), ajffd, 127 F.2d
923 (2d Cir. 1942) (property acquired in like-kind exchange and then sold upon liquidation of
acquiring corporation was disqualified for nonrecognition of income under § 1031 since corpo-
rate taxpayer did not "hold for investment").
26. Although not defined in § 1031, a "dealer" is normally considered one who holds real
estate in the normal course of his business. Courts often use the term "dealer" as a convenient
means of differentiating investors from persons who buy and sell property in the normal course
of their business. A dealer, however, is entitled to nonrecognition treatment if he holds prop-
erty for investment and not for sale to customers. 3B J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION § 22.138 (1980); see Margolis v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 1001, 1003 (1964).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l (1967). But see Loughborough Dev. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 29 B.T.A. 95, 98-99 (1933) (property acquired by real estate developer in exchange
deemed eligible for nonrecognition treatment under § 1031 since the court found that the
property had not been accumulated for immediate sale).
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ever, the Tax Court has interpreted the holding requirement in light of each
individual set of facts. In doing so, the Tax Court has not limited the pri-
marily-for-sale 28 prohibition to dealers.29 In one case the Tax Court held
that a single-family home acquired in a like-kind exchange was taxable since
the taxpayer offered the property for sale and did sell it shortly after she
finished painting it.30
In determining whether property met the holding requirement by examin-
ing when the taxpayer disposed of it, courts faced the difficult task of decid-
ing how long taxpayers must hold the property to qualify for nonrecognition
treatment under section 103 1.3 1 Due to the difficulties of framing the hold-
ing requirement in terms of a time period, the question of a taxpayer's intent
at the time of the exchange became an important factor in determining quali-
fication for nonrecognition. 32 In this context the critical time became the
time of the exchange. 33 Thus, if at the time of an exchange the taxpayer
intends to use the property received for personal purposes or to make a gift
of such property, then the exchange does not satisfy the holding requirement
of section 103 1. 34 A tax-free exchange followed immediately by a taxable
disposition of the exchanged property indicates that the taxpayer did not
intend the property to represent a continuation of his investment.3 5 Never-
theless, in a post-exchange gift case, Wagensen v. Commissioner,36 the Tax
Court allowed nonrecognition treatment on an exchange even though the
28. The Tax Court cited Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court defined "primarily" to mean "of first importance." Bernard v. Commissioner, 26
T.C.M. (CCH) 859, 863 (1967).
29. See Harr v. MacLaughlen, 15 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Pa. 1936) (properties acquired by a
bank or other institution solely for the purpose of foreclosure sale treated like dealer-held
property); Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333 (property received in a like-kind exchange is not
considered held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if the taxpayer
intends immediately to sell the acquired property).
30. Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90, 96 (1960).
31. Courts have not given a definitive term to the length of time taxpayers should hold the
property for § 1031 purposes. Indeed, in describing the holding requirement, the text of the
64th Congressional Record indicated that after the exchange of like-kind property, the taxpayer
"[t]hen ... must hold the land he receives in exchange as an investment, at least, for a time".
64 CONG. REC. 2856 (1923) (statement of Rep. Hawley).
32. See, e.g., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1354 (9th Cir. 1979) (court upheld
nonrecognition treatment based on analysis of several decisions that emphasized the taxpayer's
intention); Smith v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 1976) ("to determine whether a
transaction is a sale or exchange, a court may look to the intent of the parties as well as to what
was actually done"); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 794 (9th Cir. 1964) (upholding
§ 1031 exchange on basis that taxpayer had no intention to sell his property for cash if it could
be exchanged for other property of like kind); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320
F.2d 333, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1963) ("[w]hether the transaction constitutes a sale or an exchange
for income tax purposes depends on the intent of the parties" (quoting Sarkes Tazian, Inc. v.
United States, 240 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1957)); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 913-15
(1978) (parties' intent examined in analysis of qualification of exchange for nonrecognition
treatment), afid, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180, 199
(1967) (upholding § 1031 exchange based on taxpayer's consistent intent and form).
33. Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-1 C.B. 247 (time of exchange crucial in evaluating validity of
nonrecognition claim in multi-party exchange).
34. See Click v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 225, 234 (1982).
35. Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 194, 208-09 (1940).
36. 74 T.C. 653 (1980).
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taxpayer gave the investment property to his children as a gift nine months
after the exchange.3 7 In Wagensen the Tax Court found that the taxpayer's
immediate intent to hold the acquired ranch for investment purposes satis-
fied the requirements of section 1031 despite the taxpayer's desire eventually
to give the ranch to his children. 38 A later case with similar facts, however,
produced a different holding.3 9 These conflicting results provide evidence
that courts may render fact-specific decisions regarding the holding
requirement.
Some courts do not find the taxpayer's intent dispositive of qualification
for section 1031 treatment. 4° These courts have held that in matters of taxa-
tion the substance of the actual transaction carries more weight than the
taxpayer's declared purpose.4 ' Specifically, courts have stressed form over
intent in cases involving three-cornered exchanges. 42 Even though the tax-
payer in a three-corner exchange acquires property with the intention of ex-
changing it again for a new parcel, the courts have upheld the applicability
of section 1031 nonrecognition treatment based on the form of the
transaction. 43
The holding requirement under section 1031 for post-exchange, nontax-
37. Id. at 660.
38. Id. at 659.
39. In Click v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 225 (1982), seven months after the exchange of a
farm for two residential properties, the taxpayer gave the residential properties to her two
children and their families occupying the homes. The children selected the properties and paid
insurance on them from the inception. The court held that the taxpayer never held the resi-
dential properties for investment purposes. Id. at 234.
40. In Ltr. Rul. 8429039 the IRS determined that a two-year holding period sufficiently
met the holding period test of § 1031 even though the taxpayer intended to sell the property at
the end of the two years. In an earlier ruling for the same taxpayer, Ltr. Rul. 8310016, the IRS
had ruled that the taxpayer's intention to dispose of the property upon completion of the
exchange would disqualify the exchange for nonrecognition treatment. Section 1031 Applied to
Property Held Two Years, 61 J. TAX'N 224 (1984).
41. Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126, 136, aff'd per curiam, 377 F.2d 534, 535 (9th
Cir. 1967) ("matters of taxation must be determined in the light of what was actually done
rather than according to the declared purposes of the participants"); J.H. Baird Publishing Co.
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 615 (1962), acq. 1963-2 C.B. 4 ("parties' expectations or hopes
as to the tax treatment of their conduct in themselves not determinative"); see also Comment,
Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-292: A Proposal to Allow the Combined Use ofSections 1031
and 351 Without Destroying the Tax-Free Status of Either, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 599, 603-
04 (1976) (parties' intent with respect to transaction does not control if form of exchange
found deficient).
42. A three-cornered exchange may occur when a taxpayer wishes to exchange his prop-
erty to avoid the discontinuation of his investment and the recognition of his gain, but "the
potential buyer of the taxpayer's property owns no property that the taxpayer wants to receive
in exchange." Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 913 (1978). In order to effect a like-kind
exchange, the buyer acquires from a third party property that meets the taxpayer's needs and
then exchanges the acquired property for the taxpayer's property. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 73-
476, 1973-2 C.B. 300, 301 (gain or loss on § 1031 exchange not recognized); Rev. Rul. 57-244,
1957-1 C.B. 247, 248 (gain in § 1031 exchange recognized only to extent cash received).
43. In Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967), taxpayers intended
from the inception to exchange their property. Their failure to adhere to the necessary form
by taking the deed directly from the owner-seller rather than through the exchange partner led
the court to hold that they sold the property. Id. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Commissioner,




able distributions has received little attention in the courts. The Service,
however, addressed this issue in a number of Revenue Rulings. In Revenue
Ruling 75-29244 the Service ruled that a taxpayer's transfer of property A to
a third party in exchange for property B, followed immediately by the tax-
payer's contribution of property B to his controlled corporation, does not
qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. 4 5 The Service
based its ruling on a finding that the property, once contributed to the corpo-
ration, does not qualify under the holding requirement. 46 According to the
Service the taxpayer intended to contribute property B to the corporation.47
When, however, a taxpayer made a section 1031 exchange followed by an-
other section 1031 transaction, the Service took a contrary position. In Rev-
enue Ruling 57-24448 the Service ruled that a unilateral exchange of three
parcels of real property among three parties qualified for tax-free treatment
under section 1031. A transferred a parcel of property to B, B transferred a
parcel to C, and C transferred a parcel to A. The Service held that the ex-
change qualified for nonrecognition under section 1031 for each of the par-
ticipants. 49 By its ruling the Service indirectly ratified the proposition that
holding the exchanged property for a subsequent exchange satisfies the hold-
ing requirement of section 1031.
Until the Tax Court's decision in Magneson v. Commissioner50 and Bolker
v. Commissioner,51 courts had not addressed the holding requirement issue
as applied to a like-kind exchange that was followed or preceded by another
tax-free transaction. In both cases the Tax Court chose to construe the hold-
ing requirement liberally, to overrule the Service's ruling, and to expand the
scope of section 1031 exchanges. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit faced an issue of first impression.
II. MAGNESON V. COMMISSIONER
In Magneson v. Commissioner the Magnesons claimed that sections 1031
and 721 allowed nonrecognition treatment of a gain or loss from an ex-
change of like-kind properties and a subsequent contribution of the property
to a partnership. In a unanimous opinion upholding the Magnesons' claim,
the court initially addressed whether the exchange satisfied the holding re-
quirement of section 103 1(a).52 The Commissioner maintained that the tax-
44. 1975-2 C.B. 333, 334.
45. Id. The second leg of the transaction, contribution of the exchanged property, would
fall within § 351, which allows a taxpayer to make a tax-free exchange of property for stock.
I.R.C. § 351 (1982).
46. 1975-2 C.B. at 334.
47. Id.
48. 1957-1 C.B. 247; see also Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300, 301 (upholding validity
of nonrecognition treatment for three-way exchange under § 1031).
49. 1954-1 C.B. at 248.
50. 81 T.C. 767, 771 (1983).
51. 81 T.C. 782 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the Bolker decision based on the continuity of ownership analysis adopted by the Tax Court in
Magneson. 760 F.2d at 1045. See Guttenberg, supra note 22, at 280-82.
52. 753 F.2d at 1492.
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payers should not receive nonrecognition treatment because they did not
hold the acquired Plaza Property for investment, as required by section
1031(a), after receiving it in exchange for the Iowa Street Property. 53 The
Magnesons, however, asserted that they met the holding-for-investment re-
quirement by holding the property for contribution to a partnership. 54 The
majority in the Tax Court had found for the Magnesons based on its deter-
mination that the taxpayers continued their investment in the Plaza Prop-
erty by contributing it to the U.S. Trust partnership. 5" The Tax Court
emphasized form over substance in finding that the Magnesons satisfied the
holding requirement because they did not liquidate their investment. 56 The
Ninth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court's conclusions of law de novo.57
To analyze whether the exchange in question met the section 1031(a)
holding provision, the court examined that section's requirements as devel-
oped in case law. According to precedent an individual must, at the time he
purchases the property, intend to keep that property for investment purposes
to gain nonrecognition treatment. 58 Since the parties had stipulated that the
Magnesons exchanged the property to hold it for contribution to the part-
nership,5 9 the court found that the controlling question was whether the tax-
payers satisfied section 1031, which requires that the taxpayer hold
exchanged property for investment, by contributing the acquired property to
a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. 60
The court next addressed the Commissioner's reliance on Revenue Ruling
75-292,61 in which the Service had ruled that a transaction in which a tax-
payer acquired property in a like-kind exchange and immediately transferred
it to a controlled corporation did not satisfy the section 1031(a) holding re-
quirement.62 The case presented in the ruling involved transfers to a corpo-
ration for stock,6 3 which the court found distinguishable on several grounds
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1493.
55. 81 T.C. at 771-72.
56. Id.
57. The court cited California Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 85, 87 (9th
Cir. 1982), in which the court held federal circuit courts had authority to review Tax Court
decisions de novo. 753 F.2d at 1493.
58. 753 F.2d at 1493. The court cited Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 931,
934 (2d Cir. 1942), which disallowed tax-deferred treatment on an exchange because immedi-
ate disposition of the acquired property showed that the taxpayer did not have the requisite
intent to hold the property for investment. Further, the court noted that in Margolis v. Com-
missioner, 337 F.2d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1964), the Ninth Circuit allowed nonrecognition
treatment on the part of the taxpayer's exchanged property because he satisfactorily proved
that he did not intend to purchase the real estate for its income-producing potential. 753 F.2d
at 1493.
59. 753 F.2d at 1493.
60. Id. The court noted a lack of precedent at both the Tax Court and the circuit court
level. Id.
61. 1975-2 C.B. 333.
62. 753 F.2d at 1493. The court, however, noted that based on the holding of Ricards v.
United States, 683 F.2d 1219, 1224 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1981), revenue rulings did not bind it,
although such rulings deserve considerable respect for the expertise they carry. 753 F.2d at
1493.
63. 1975-2 C.B. at 333-34.
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from a transfer to a partnership for a general partnership interest. 64 First
the transfer of property to a corporation differs because a corporation forms
an entity that is distinct from its shareholders. 65 A partnership, on the other
hand, forms an association of its partner investors. 66 Second, the court rea-
soned that a taxpayer who transfers property to a corporation in exchange
for stock relinquishes ownership and control of the property, but general
partners maintain control of any property in the partnership. 67 Third, the
court noted that the express language of section 1031(a) excludes stock as
property eligible for exchange. 68 Based on these observations the court re-
jected the applicability of Revenue Ruling 75-292 to this case. 69
Having found the Commissioner's arguments unpersuasive, the court re-
ferred to the legislative history of section 1031 for guidance. The drafters of
sections 103 1(a) and 72170 intended to provide for nonrecognition of gain on
transfers of property in which the taxpayer receives property that differs
only in form, and not in substance, from the property with which the tax-
payer parted. 71 The court stated that the taxpayers' transaction met this
determinative test for nonrecognition under section 1031.72
In prior cases under section 1031(a) courts examined the nature of the
taxpayer's ownership interest as well as the type of property owned to decide
whether the exchange met the requirements of that section.73 Accordingly,
64. 753 F.2d at 1493.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See generally CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1977) (management and control of
corporation); Id. §§ 15,018(e), 15,024 (partner rights to management and control of partner-
ship assets).
68. 753 F.2d at 1493-94.
69. Id. at 1494.
70. I.R.C. § 721 (1982); see supra note 4.
71. 753 F.2d at 1494 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960)). Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1002-1(c) addresses the exceptions to the general rule that a taxpayer must realize his
income or loss upon sale or exchange of property. 1.R.C. § 1001 (1982). The regulation states
that "[t]he underlying assumption of these exceptions is that the new property is substantially
a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated ...." Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960).
The court stated that the continuation of the taxpayer's investment provides the basis for non-
recognition of gain or loss in the transactions that fall within §§ 1031 and 721. The taxpayer,
in other words, remains in essentially the same economic situation after the transaction since
he transferred his investment to like-kind property instead of liquidating it. 753 F.2d at 1494;
see Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 905, 913-14 (1978), af'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
54, 63-64 (1978).
72. 753 F.2d at 1494. The Commissioner and the dissenting judges in the Tax Court
argued that the change in the form of ownership meant that the property did not meet the
holding requirements of § 1031(a). Id. at 1495. Judge Tannenwald, writing for the dissent,
disagreed with the majority's holding that the Magnesons' contribution to the partnership sat-
isfied the requirements of § 1031 as the old investment continuing in an unliquidated, albeit
modified, form. 81 T.C. at 775. He found the differences between the interest of a tenant in
common and that of a general partner too great under California law to qualify as like-kind
within the meaning of § 1031. Id. at 778.
73. See Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 556, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (general partnership and limited partnership interests not like-kind property); Pappas
v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1086-87 (1982) (general partnership exchanged for general
partnership qualifies as like-kind); Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045, 1066-68 (1981) (joint
venture exchanged for general partnership qualifies as like-kind); Gulfstream Land & Dev.
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the court addressed the change in the nature of the Magnesons' ownership
interest under California law. 74 The court concluded that a change in the
form of legal ownership did not undermine the continuity of investment pur-
pose under section 103 1.75 Both as tenants in common and as general part-
ners the Magnesons had a right to possess and control the property. 76
Although California partnership law limits a partner's possession and con-
trol of partnership property,77 the court found that the underlying purpose
of the partnership, similar to the Magnesons' purpose as tenants in common,
consisted of holding the Plaza Property for investment. 78 The court did not
find the difference in the ability to alienate the property79 under the common
tenancy and the partnership interests persuasive because the underlying
premise of section 1031 is to prevent alienation of property.80
Having determined that the exchange met the continuity of investment
principles of section 1031, the court considered the Commissioner's conten-
tion that focusing on the continuity of investment principle ignored the spe-
cific-description requirement of section 1031.8 1 Treasury Regulations under
that section state that the Code provides nonrecognition treatment only
when the exchange meets the Code's specific description of an exchange and
the statute's underlying purpose. 82 The court had rejected a similar argu-
ment in Starker v. Commissioner83 because of the weight of authority against
Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 595 (1979) (joint venture exchanged for joint venture
qualifies as like-kind); Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 63-64 (1978) (unencumbered fee
exchanged for fee subject to 99-year leasehold interest qualifies as like-kind).
74. In the application of federal tax statutes, state law controls in determining the nature
of the legal interest that the taxpayer holds in the property asserted as taxable. Aquilino v.
United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960).
75. 753 F.2d at 1497.
76. See Dimmick v. Dimmick, 58 Cal. 2d 417, 422, 374 P.2d 824, 826, 24 Cal. Rptr. 856,
858 (1962) (defining rights of tenants in common); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025(1) (West Supp.
1984) (defining relationship among partners in general partnerships).
77. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025(2)(a), (c), (d) & (e) (West Supp. 1984).
78. 753 F.2d at 1496. Compare the Tax Court's holding, which generalized under a
broader continuity of investment analysis and looked at the economic basis and accounting of
the property, which remained the same. 81 T.C. 767, 771 (1983).
79. The court noted that a tenant in common can freely alienate his interest, but a partner
cannot freely alienate specific partnership property. 753 F.2d at 1496. Compare R. CUNNING-
HAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 198-99 (1984) (tenants in
common are generally free to alienate property without co-tenant's permission) with R. HAM-
ILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 88-89
(1981) (citing UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25 (1969) (partner cannot separately assign his
interest in partnership assets).
80. 753 F.2d at 1496.
81. Id. at 1498. The Commissioner argued that an exchange must comply with that part
of regulation 1.1002-1(b) that provides:
The exceptions from the general rule requiring the recognition of all gains and
losses ... are strictly construed and do not extend either beyond the words or
the underlying assumptions and purposes of the exception. Nonrecognition is
accorded by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 only if the exchange is one
which satisfies both (1) the specific description in the Code of an excepted ex-
change, and (2) the underlying purpose for which such an exchange is excepted
from the general rule.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
83. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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such analysis.84 The court emphasized that in a situation such as the
Magnesons' transaction, in which the taxpayer continues to hold the prop-
erty for investment, a variation in the form of ownership would not decide
the issue of qualification for nonrecognition treatment if the taxpayer's con-
trol of his investment and the nature of the investment remained substan-
tially the same.8 5
The Commissioner alternatively argued that the step transaction doctrine
prevented section 1031 nonrecognition. 8 6 This doctrine allows the court to
collapse a taxpayer's several steps when the steps result in more favorable
tax treatment than if the transaction had occurred in the direct route con-
templated by the Code.87 The court examined two other ways that the tax-
payers could have achieved the same result, but concluded that neither
hypothetical route more directly achieved the same end.88 Based on cited
precedent,89 the court found that the taxpayers were entitled to accomplish
their transaction by whichever of two equally direct modes would allow
them the best tax treatment. 90
Despite its conclusion that the taxpayers chose the most direct route
under the Code, the court stated that the Magnesons would have qualified
for nonrecognition treatment even under the step transaction doctrine.91
The Commissioner argued that Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner92 precluded
this result. 93 In Meyer a general partnership interest and a limited partner-
ship interest did not qualify as like-kind property even though the underly-
ing assets of the partnerships consisted of like-kind property. 94 The court
distinguished Meyer, however, on the ground that Meyer involved general
84. Id. at 1352. The court found the following cases that liberally construed the § 1031
requirements more persuasive than the Commissioner's narrow construction in Starker: Al-
derson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1963) (nonrecognition treatment given to
three-corner exchange); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 913-14 (1978) (nonrecognition
treatment given to four-corner exchange).
85. 753 F.2d at 1497.
86. Id.
87. See Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 923 (1972); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333 (1945).
88. 753 F.2d at 1497. The first alternative way that the Magnesons could have achieved
the same result from their transaction involved selling the Iowa Street Property, buying ten
percent of the Plaza Property with the proceeds, and then forming the partnership with
N.E.R. Plaza, Ltd. By the second route the taxpayers could have "formed the partnership
with the Iowa Street Property and ninety percent of the Plaza Property and then the partner-
ship could have exchanged the Iowa Street Property for the remaining ten percent of the Plaza
Property." Id.
89. The court cited Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 913 (1978), afl'd, 632 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1980) (qualified in Starker, 602 F.2d at 1353 n.10).
90. 753 F.2d at 1497.
91. Id.
92. 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
93. 753 F.2d at 1498. Focusing on the underlying purpose of the transaction and the
management and control of the property, the court did not address the fact that the transac-
tion, if collapsed, would have consisted of an exchange of the Iowa Street Property, which is
real property, for a partnership interest, which is personalty under California law. Thus, col-
lapsing the transaction under the doctrine in this theoretical manner would have disqualified
the exchange under the like-kind requirement of § 1031. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15026 (West
1977 & Supp. 1985).
94. 503 F.2d at 557-58.
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partners and limited partners, whose rights with respect to partnership prop-
erty differ more significantly than the general partners and fee owners in
Magneson.95
Finally, the court considered whether partnership interests qualified for
exchange treatment under section 1031.96 Following precedent, 97 the court
held that an exchange of like-kind partnership interests could qualify for
nonrecognition under section 1031 only if the underlying assets of the part-
nership also qualified as like-kind as defined by the section. 98 This require-
ment deters the formation and exchange of partnership interests composed
of non-like-kind assets to circumvent the like-kind requirement of section
1031. 99 Applying this requirement to the case, the court found that the tax-
payers' original investment corresponded in like-kind to property held by the
partnership, and thus qualified for nonrecognition under section 1031(a).100
Although the court affirmed the Tax Court decision for the Magnesons,
the court limited its holding to those situations in which the taxpayer ex-
changes property for like-kind property with the intent of contributing the
acquired property to a partnership for a general partnership interest.°10 The
court further narrowed its holding by requiring the taxpayer to show that
the partnership exists to hold the property for investment and that the total
assets of the partnership remain predominantly of like-kind to the taxpayer's
original investment. 10 2
III. CONCLUSION
The section 1031 requirement that a taxpayer effecting a like-kind ex-
change must hold the acquired property for investment purposes has gener-
ated a variety of interpretations of the parameters of the holding requirement
in case law, revenue rulings, and commentaries. In an attempt to define the
holding requirement the courts and the Service have referred to other Code
sections with similar language, examined the taxpayer's intent at the time of
the exchange, considered the amount of time the taxpayer held the property,
and reviewed the form of the transaction. These efforts, however, did not
clearly define the holding requirement. The Service has persisted in its ef-
forts to interpret the holding requirement narrowly. The decision in
Magneson v. Commissioner introduces a much broader interpretation of the
holding requirement. The decisions of both the Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit permit a taxpayer to satisfy the holding requirement, even though
the taxpayer immediately disposes of the property, as long as the transaction
satisfies the continuity of investment principle. Although this holding allows
95. 753 F.2d at 1497.
96. Id. at 1498.
97. The court relied on Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078, 1087 (1982), and Gulf-
stream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 594-96 (1979).
98. 753 F.2d at 1498.
99. See supra note 97.





the taxpayer to enter into another transaction immediately following a like-
kind exchange, the continuity of investment principle limits the second
transaction to a tax-free exchange or contribution that substantially contin-
ues the investment, though in modified form. Magneson's analytical ap-
proach to the holding requirement thus broadens the scope of section 1031
exchanges despite the court's limiting language.
Ellie D. Landon

